Most projects start tokenomics design with a pie chart: 30% team, 20% investors, 15% ecosystem. But where did these numbers come from? Why 30% and not 15%? Why these specific groups? Without answering “for whom are we designing and why each group needs the token”, the allocation is random — not designed.
Stakeholders are the starting point of any token economic model. Their composition, motivation, and time horizon determine every subsequent decision: allocation, vesting, supply model, utility mechanisms. This article provides a complete stakeholder typology, an analytical framework for their interests, and a practical approach to balancing them.
What Are Stakeholders
A stakeholder is any participant who influences the ecosystem or depends on it. In traditional loyalty systems (Web2), the project fully controls the economy: issues points, sets exchange rules, and can change terms unilaterally.
In tokenized systems (Web3), the situation is fundamentally different:
| Characteristic | Loyalty system (Web2) | Tokenized system (Web3) |
|---|---|---|
| Control | Project manages points | Stakeholder owns the token |
| Transferability | Points are non-transferable | Token is freely tradeable |
| Pricing | Fixed rate set by project | Market price on exchange |
| Decisions | Project decides for user | Stakeholder makes independent decisions |
| Ecosystem | Closed | Open (independent services, DEXs) |
Stakeholder Typology
Stakeholders fall into two groups by their interaction horizon: short-term and long-term. This distinction is critical for design: short-term participants create liquidity and attention, long-term ones create sustainability and value.
Short-Term Stakeholders
These participants come for quick gains. They don’t plan to stay in the ecosystem for years, but they serve a vital function — bringing capital and attention.
| Stakeholder | Interest | What the system gets |
|---|---|---|
| Speculators | Quick profit, calculated returns | Capital inflow, trading volume, buzz |
| Traders | Profit from volatility and arbitrage, high liquidity | Liquidity provision, price discovery |
| Influencers | Access to exclusive opportunities, promotion rewards | Marketing, new user acquisition |
Long-Term Stakeholders
These participants form the ecosystem’s foundation. Their departure destroys the system, so tokenomics must provide them with sustainable motivation.
| Stakeholder | Interest | What the system gets |
|---|---|---|
| Users | Useful, secure product; usage rewards | Active usage, feedback, new participant referrals |
| Gamers (in GameFi) | Engaging gameplay, fair rewards, asset earnings | Active participation, asset spending, content creation |
| Community | Exclusive access, ability to influence the project | Marketing, brand image, new participant referrals |
| Market makers | Income from price management and liquidity, arbitrage | Price stability, reduced volatility |
| Team and advisors | High income, a great product or landmark project | Achieving product goals, loyalty, connections and expertise |
| Validators | Predictable sustainable income, governance participation | Network uptime, governance participation, security |
| Liquidity providers | Predictable passive income, rewards | Liquidity provision, price stability |
| Investors | High return-to-risk ratio, growth potential, transparency | Early-stage capital, connections and expertise |
Stakeholder Matrix
The typology shows who participates in the system. But for designing tokenomics, you need a practical tool — the stakeholder matrix. For each participant, define three parameters: motivation, token acquisition model, and holding horizon.
| Stakeholder | Motivation | Acquisition model | Horizon |
|---|---|---|---|
| Team | Project growth, reputation | Allocation (cliff + linear vesting) | 3–5 years |
| Investors | Return relative to risk | Allocation (cliff + vesting) | 1–3 years |
| Users | Product access, rewards | Airdrop, reward | Ongoing |
| Validators | Stable income, influence | Reward (validation emissions) | 2–5 years |
| Liquidity providers | Fees, rewards | Reward (LP incentives) | 6–18 months |
| Treasury | Ecosystem development | Allocation | Indefinite |
- Vesting_horizon(i) — duration of vesting + cliff for stakeholder i (months)
- Holding_horizon(i) — operationally: the time needed for stakeholder i to deliver the value they were brought in for. For the team — product maturation window (typically 3–5 years to a working product at scale). For investors — expected holding period in their fund thesis (typically 2–4 years). For liquidity providers — the period until organic liquidity replaces incentivized liquidity (typically 6–18 months)
- Design rule: a stakeholder’s vesting must not be shorter than their expected horizon
- Otherwise the stakeholder receives tokens and leaves before creating value
Conflicts of Interest
The hardest part of working with stakeholders is managing conflicts. Each group has its own utility function, and these functions contradict each other.
- U(i) — stakeholder i’s utility function
- R(i) — benefit from participation (income, access, influence)
- C(i) — costs (time, capital, risk)
- A stakeholder stays in the system as long as U(i) > 0
Worked examples of R and C by group:
| Stakeholder | R(i) — benefits | C(i) — costs |
|---|---|---|
| Team | Salary in tokens + allocation upside, reputation, control | Time (years of product work), opportunity cost of other offers, reputational risk if project fails |
| Investors | Token appreciation relative to entry price, pro-rata in follow-ons | Capital locked during vesting, fund illiquidity, portfolio risk |
| Users | Product utility, rewards, airdrop value | Gas fees, time to learn the product, counterparty risk |
| Validators | Staking rewards + fees, governance influence | Hardware + infra costs, slashing risk, stake locked |
| Liquidity providers | Trading fees + LP incentives | Impermanent loss, smart-contract risk, opportunity cost of capital |
Team vs Investors
| Parameter | Team’s interest | Investors’ interest |
|---|---|---|
| Vesting duration | Longer (tie to results) | Shorter (faster profit realization) |
| TGE unlock | Minimal (less price pressure) | Maximum (immediate liquidity) |
| Valuation | Higher (less dilution) | Lower (more tokens for the same money) |
Resolution: investor cliff no shorter than 6 months post-TGE, team vesting at least 12 months longer than investor vesting. A common concrete instantiation of this rule in 2025 is team 4-year vesting with a 1-year cliff against investor 2–3-year vesting with a 6-month cliff — giving the team roughly 12–24 months of additional runway beyond the investor tail.
Investors vs Users
Investors receive tokens at a discount to market price. When vesting ends, they sell — creating price pressure. Users who bought on the open market lose value.
- Pressure(t) — aggregate sell pressure in month t
- Unlock(i, t) — stakeholder i’s unlock in month t
- P_sell(i) — sell probability for group i
- Priors used below (not empirical benchmarks): investors P = 0.3–0.7; team P = 0.05–0.15; liquidity providers P ≈ 0.30. These are calibrated modeling defaults, not industry-validated figures — empirical unlock-tracking platforms report price impact and supply overhangs, not per-group sell probabilities. Adjust against observed behavior for your cohort. See vesting benchmarks for the sell-pressure empirical example.
- First-order approximation: the formula assumes P_sell is independent of price, unlock size, and time since TGE. In practice all three matter — large unlocks into thin order books and recent-TGE unlocks into weak markets raise P_sell; deep holding after multiple unlocks lowers it.
Resolution: smooth vesting (monthly, not quarterly), cliff after price stabilization, utility mechanisms (staking, governance) that create alternatives to selling.
Traders vs Liquidity Providers
Traders profit from volatility. Liquidity providers earn from fees but lose to impermanent loss (IL), which grows with volatility. The better it is for traders, the worse for LPs.
Resolution: concentrated liquidity, dynamic fees, IL compensation through additional reward incentives.
Quantitative Conflict Example
Consider a project with total supply of 100,000,000 tokens. The 20 / 15 / 30 / 20 / 15 split below is illustrative only, not a recommendation. For context, 2025 industry benchmarks cluster as: Community + Ecosystem 35–45% (often > 50% combined), Team 17–20%, Investors 12–18%, Treasury 20–25%. The example here runs Community slightly low to keep the arithmetic clean — see vesting benchmarks for current ranges.
| Group | Allocation | Vesting | TGE unlock | Sell pressure (month 13) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Team | 20% | 48 mo, 12-mo cliff | 0% | 20M × (1/36) × 0.10 = 55,556 |
| Investors | 15% | 24 mo, 6-mo cliff | 5% | (15M − 750K) × (1/18) × 0.50 = 395,833 |
| Community | 30% | None (airdrop + reward) | — | Depends on mechanisms |
| Treasury | 20% | DAO-managed | 0% | 0 (locked) |
| Liquidity | 15% | 12 mo linear | 20% | 0 (vesting completed at month 12) |
In month 13, investors create 7.1x more sell pressure than the team (liquidity vesting has already finished by then). This is a predictable conflict — it must be offset by utility mechanisms that create demand.
Python: sell pressure calculation by month
import json
stakeholders = {
"Team": {"alloc": 20_000_000, "cliff": 12, "vesting": 48, "tge": 0.00, "p_sell": 0.10},
"Investors": {"alloc": 15_000_000, "cliff": 6, "vesting": 24, "tge": 0.05, "p_sell": 0.50},
"Liquidity": {"alloc": 15_000_000, "cliff": 0, "vesting": 12, "tge": 0.20, "p_sell": 0.30},
}
results = []
for month in range(1, 49):
pressure = {}
for name, s in stakeholders.items():
tge_tokens = s["alloc"] * s["tge"]
remaining = s["alloc"] - tge_tokens
vesting_months = s["vesting"] - s["cliff"]
if vesting_months <= 0:
monthly_unlock = 0
elif month <= s["cliff"]:
monthly_unlock = 0
elif month <= s["vesting"]:
monthly_unlock = remaining / vesting_months
else:
monthly_unlock = 0
pressure[name] = round(monthly_unlock * s["p_sell"])
pressure["month"] = month
pressure["total"] = sum(v for k, v in pressure.items() if k != "month")
results.append(pressure)
# Peak pressure months
peak = max(results, key=lambda x: x["total"])
print(f"Peak pressure: month {peak['month']}, {peak['total']:,} tokens")
for name in stakeholders:
print(f" {name}: {peak[name]:,}")
Common Stakeholder Analysis Mistakes
Mistake checklist
From Stakeholders to Supply Models
Stakeholder analysis is the second stage of the tokenomics design process. The output is a completed matrix where each stakeholder’s motivation, acquisition model, and horizon are defined. The matrix then drives the choice of supply models:
| If the stakeholder needs… | Supply model |
|---|---|
| Fixed share of total supply | Allocation (with vesting) |
| Reward for a targeted action | Reward or airdrop |
| Tie to market demand | Bonding curve or DEX |
Each stakeholder maps to a specific supply model. If you can’t find a model for a stakeholder, reconsider whether they need the token at all. Sometimes stablecoin payments or fiat compensation is a more honest solution than tokenization for its own sake.
Stakeholders also define requirements for mechanism design: what incentives and penalties are needed so that honest behavior by each participant leads to system-wide sustainability.
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